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Abstract: 
 
This research aims to examine the influence of concentration rate of the four 
largest full-fledged Islamic commercial banks (BUS) on the performance of 
Islamic Rural Banks (BPRS) using ordinary least square (OLS) method.  
The results show that BUS, Islamic Banking Subsidiary (UUS), and BPRS have 
always been operating within the same financing market of murabaha products 
and competing for the same Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) 
sector.  
Another result finds that despite the high level of concentration from the four 
largest BUS, the concentration rate insignificantly affects the profitability level of 
BPRS. This insignificant influence indicates that BUS, UUS, and BPRS are 
operating in a monopolistic market. It also proves the efficiency hypothesis in 
Islamic banking industry in Indonesia.  
Furthermore, this research confirms the competition-fragility theory where the 
concentration rate of the largest BUS negatively influences non-performing 
financing (NPF) rate of BPRS. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Micro, small, and medium scale enterprises (MSME) sector plays an important role 
in the economy of Indonesia and they dominate the Indonesian economic 
landscape.  However, the majority of MSME in Indonesia still has no access to 
financing services from banks or other formal financial institutions since these 
types of businesses tend to be mostly unbankable. The Islamic banking industry in 
Indonesia consists of full-fledged commercial Islamic banks (BUS), Islamic 
banking subsidiaries (UUS), and Islamic Rural Banks (BPRS). BPRS, similar to 
the conventional counterparts (BPR), are mainly addressed to empower MSME 
sector particularly in rural areas.  However, there is an increasing pattern recently 
where BUS and UUS distribute more financing to MSME. This situation rises a 
question on whether BUS, UUS, and BPRS are operating in the same market. The 
market boundary between the three types of banks should be defined clearly 
because a situation where BUS, UUS, and BPRS compete with each others will 
affect the market concentration and the performance level of all parties. 
 
Profitability measurements in banking industry mostly are in the form of Return on 
Asset (ROA) or Return on Equity (ROE). Financial Service Authority of Indonesia 
(2016) reports that BPRS tend to have the lowest ROE compared to BUS and UUS. 
However, after 2013, all BPRS have higher ROE than those of BUS and UUS. The 
increase of ROE raises question whether it is influenced by changing in market 
concentration which contributes to growth of profitability level at BPRS. 
Meanwhile, the rate of ROA at BPRS appears to be more stagnant with a tendency 
to decrease in a long term. 
 
Market concentration may also affect other performance indicators of banks 
including financing risk. Both theoretically and empirically, the influence of 
concentration rate in banking industry on financing risk has been proven by 
previous studies (Alhassan et al., 2014; Heimdal and Solberg, 2015; Jiménez et al., 
2010). The analysis relative to the performance of BPRS regarding with market 
concentration is becoming more important to be evaluated yet there has been no 
discussion on BPRS concerning this topic so far. Hence, this research fills in the 
gap from previous studies and aims to: (1) identify market boundary among BPRS, 
BUS, and UUS; (2) examine the influence of market concentration on ROE and 
ROA yielded by BPRS, and (3) examine the influence of market concentration on 
NPF faced by BPRS. The results of this study are expected to contribute to a more 
integrated policy recommendations in regulating BUS, UUS, and BPRS in 
Indonesia. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This paper refers to past similar studies in the same methods with different objects 
of research. Previous studies about BPRS mostly discuss about level of efficiency 
(Hosen and Muhari, 2013; Muhari, 2013), profitability (Warninda and Hosen, 
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2015), and liquidity (Mongid, 2015). Meanwhile, research which examine the 
influence of market structure on the performance of banks in Indonesia have 
already involved conventional  commercial  banks  or  BUK  (Hapsari, 2011;  
Jumono et al., 2016; Naylah, 2010; Yudaruddin, 2014), BUS and UUS (Fahmi, 
2012). Several studies with similar topic have also been undertaken in banking 
sector from other countries or regions such as Europe (Staikouras and Wood, 
2004), Ghana (Alhassan et al., 2014), Malawi (Chirwa, 1999) and Norway 
(Heimdal and Solberg, 2015). 
 
In order to answer the objectives of this study, the market boundary should be 
defined rigorously (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Fahmi (2012) builds a market 
boundary model where total amount of third-party fund is set as dependent variable 
to determine boundaries between Islamic banks and conventional banks in 
Indonesia. The results indicate a significant negative correlation between third-
party fund of Islamic banks and conventional banks’ interest rate which bring to a 
conclusion that Islamic banks and conventional banks are not operating within the 
same market. In fact, there are complementary relationships between Islamic banks 
and conventional banks. Using total amount of mudharaba deposit as dependent 
variable, Kasri and Kassim (2009) find the same result in which interest rate on 
conventional banks’ deposit significantly affects Islamic banks’ deposit. However, 
they neglected to elaborate how the finding determines market boundary.  
 
In an attempt to see how market concentration influences profitability level of 
banks, many studies use a model based on Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm. By using concentration rate (CR) and market share (MS) as indicators of 
market structure, Fahmi (2012) states a significant correlation between market 
structure and ROA in BUS and UUS which supports in favour of Efficiency 
Hypothesis (EH). His result is in line with Yudaruddin (2014) who focuses on 
banking industry in Indonesia. Yudaruddin’s paper shows not only a significant 
positive correlation between CR and ROA, but also a negative correlation between 
operating expense ratio (OER) and ROA. The latter discovery strengthens the fact 
that banking industry in Indonesia appears to support EH instead of traditional 
hypothesis of SCP.  
 
Many researchers have already worked on the influence of market concentration on 
other performance indices of banks, especially financing risk.  Fundamentally, 
there are three ways of market concentration in influencing financing risks which 
have been proven by previous studies. Hellmann, Murdock and Stigilitz (2000) 
state that competition undermines prudent bank behaviour, thus supporting 
competition-fragility theory. By contrast, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose 
competition-stability theory where banks become more risky as the market 
becomes more concentrated. 
 
3. Method of Study 
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This study draws on data from several sources: Sharia Banking Statistics (SBS), 
Indonesian Economic and Financial Statistics (SEKI), and the statistics publication 
from Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). SBS and SEKI database are compiled by 
Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) and Financial Service Authority (OJK). Although 
the objects of this study are BPRS, some data of BUS and UUS are also 
incorporated into the model to determine concentration ratio variable which 
describes the current situation of market structure. 
 
The main purpose of this research is to examine the performance level of BPRS 
with regards to market concentration. In order to understand a correlation between 
those two aspects, this study uses regression instrument as a method in estimating 
the models. Through the use of regression, this research is able to estimate how 
each of independent variables influences dependent variables. Three models can be 
explained as follow: 
 
3.1 Market Boundary 
 
Investigating market boundary is a substantial matter in this study since there is a 
question on whether BPRS, BUS, and UUS are practically operating within the 
same market. If the result reveals a joint market, this study will calculate not only 
BPRS, but also BUS and UUS as a part of concentration rate variable to answer the 
second and the third objectives. 
 
In order to determine the market boundary, this research uses an estimated model 
which is essentially the same as the one used by Fahmi (2012) with some 
modifications. While Fahmi employs total amount of third-party fund (TPF) as 
dependent variable, this study uses total amount of murabaha financing. 
Meanwhile, the use of murabaha form of financing is due to high dependency of 
Islamic banks on transactions based on murabaha contract. The time series of data 
employed are modelled as below: 
 
Log MURt =  a0 + a1 RRMURBUSUUSt + a2 RRMURBPRSt + a3 OFFICEt + 
a4 t  + a5 CPIt + a6 IPI + et              (1) 
 
where MUR is the total amount of murabaha financing distributed by BPRS, 
RRMURBUSUUS is the rate of return (RR) of murabaha financing at BUS and 
UUS, RRMURBPRS is the RR of murabaha financing at BPRS, OFFICE is the 
number of BPRS offices,  is the RR relative which is calculated by 
comparing between RRMURBUSUUS and RRMURBPRS, CPI is the consumer 
price index as a proxy of inflation, IPI is  the industrial production index as a proxy 
of gross domestic product, and e is a stochastic error term. 
 
3.2 The Influence of Market Concentration on Profitability 
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This study applies structural approach in examining the influence of concentration 
ratio of the four largest banks on profitability level. The structural approach 
consists of traditional hypothesis of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
approach, efficiency hypothesis (EH), and several other formal approaches with 
roots in the industrial organization theory (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). The SCP 
argues that collusive practices among largest banks occur due to a highly 
concentrated market. Meanwhile, EH believes that largest banks are benefitted 
from level of efficiency, thus enhancing profitability in a very concentrated market.  
To gain insight in the influence of market concentration on profitability, the 
following regression model is run:  
 
ROEt = b1 + b2CR4t + b3 TAt + b4 TPFt + b5OERt + b6CARt + et                           (2) 
 
ROAt = c1 + c2CR4t + c3 TAt + c4 TPFt + c5OERt + c6CARt + et                            (3) 
 
where, ROE is return on equity at BPRS, ROA is return on asset at BPRS, CR4 is 
the concentration ratio of four largest banks in market, TA is the total amount of 
asset, TPF is the total amount of third-party fund, OER is the operating expense 
ratio or the ratio of operating cost to operating income, CAR is the capital 
adequacy ratio, and and e is stocasthic error. 
 
3.3 The Influence of Market Concentration on Profitability 
 
There is a vast amount of literatures which have empirically proven that market 
structure indicators, including market concentration, influences financing risk 
encountered by banks. The focus on financing risk itself is driven by the fact that 
financing risk is primarily the countershaft of risks for most existing banks, despite 
any other risks. Thus, the third model of this study estimates how concentration 
rate of the four largest banks (CR4) affects non-performing financing (NPF) ratio 
at BPRS. To examine the influence of market concentration on financing risk, the 
following regression model is estimated by: 
 
NPFt = d1 + d2CR4t +  d3CARt + d4FDRt + d5ROAt + d6RRMURBUSUUSt + d7 
CPIt  + d8 IPIt + et                                                                                                    (4) 
 
where, NPF is non-performing ratio at BPRS, CR4 is concentration rate of four 
largest banks in the market, CAR is capital adequacy ratio at BPRS, FDR is  
financing to deposit ratio, ROA is return on asset ratio, RRMURBUSUUS is the 
rate of return murabaha financing at BUS and UUS, CPI is consumer price index as 
a proxy of inflation, IPI is industrial index production as a proxy of economic 
growth, and e is a stochastic error. The research structure is presented in Figure 1. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Market Boundary 
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Determining market boundary is the first step on analyzing market concentration 
evolution in banking industry (Bikker and Naaf, 2002). Table 1 demonstrates 
descriptive statistics of both dependent variable as well as independent variables 
while Table 2 shows the results of regression analysis. 
 
According to Table 2, the rate of return murabaha (RRMUR) from BUS and UUS 
has a positive significant coefficient at 0.53. This result indicates that the total 
amount of murabaha financing distributed by BPRS increases when RRMUR 
offered by BUS and UUS escalates. Customers of Islamic banks have the 
characteristics of not being loyal and sensitive towards changes on rate of return 
from both financing and funding products.3 These characteristics motivate 
customers to switch to BPRS when BUS and UUS set their RRMUR higher than 
before, creating an increase in total amount of murabaha financing at BPRS. The 
significant influence between those two variables confirms an unrestricted market 
boundary among BPRS, BUS, and UUS. 
 
Figure 1. Research Strtucture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3Being disloyal is not necessarily the characteristics of Islamic banks’ costumers only, but 
also conventional banks. In Islamic banking field, these types of customers are known as 
“rational customers” and are dominating the industry instead of “emotional customers” 
who stick to Islamic banks due to their sharia principles. 
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Table 1. The Summary of Statistics of Market Boundary Model 
 MUR RRMUR 
RRMU
R  
RRMUR 
BUSUUS
/BPRS 
OFFICE CPI IPI 
Mean 2729288 0.19 0.17 0.91 368.71 126.68 
110.6
8 
Med. 2742817 0.19 0.15 0.76 386 126.29 
112.3
1 
Max. 4281505 0.23 0.86 4.38 486 146.84 
127.7
4 
Min. 1277588 0.18 0.12 0.59 262 110.99 92.55 
Std. 
Dev 
938432.1 0.01 0.14 0.71 62.51 10.16 8.876 
Skewn. 0.02 2.43 4.34 4.33 -0.34 0.28 0.02 
Kurt. 1.59 14.23 20.04 20.03 1.94 2.19 1.96 
Number 
of obs. 
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
 
Fahmi (2012) highlights several findings which can be linked to this result. First, 
he argues that BUS-UUS and BUK are operating in the different markets and 
complementing each other. If the finding is associated to the significant positive 
value of RRMUR by BUS and UUS at 0.53 as mentioned earlier, it can be 
concluded that BPRS and BUK face different market segmentation as well. 
Furthermore, he suggests a monopolistic competition between BUS and UUS. 
Since the current study has already confirmed that BPRS, BUS, and UUS are 
operating within the same market, BPRS are also expected to be under 
monopolistic competition.4 
 
Table 2. Regression Result of Market Boundary Model (Y = Murabaha Financing) 
Key Variables Coefficient t-statistic P-Value 
Constants 0.12 0.25 0.80 
Return Rate of Murabaha – BUSUUS 0.53 2.10* 0.04* 
Murabaha Rate of Return Relative  -0.52  -2.29*  0.03* 
Return Rate of Murabaha – BPRS -1.65 -2.27* 0.03* 
Total Offices 1.31 11.69* 0.00* 
Consumer Price Index 0.01 6.59 0.92 
Industrial Production Index -1.54 -0.10* 0.00* 
R-Squared 0.96* 
F-test 0.00* 
Note: *5% of level significance 
                                                          
4Hosen and Fitria (2017) confirm that BPRS alone, without involving BUS and UUS, face 
monopolistic competition. 
   The Performance of Islamic Rural Banks in Indonesia: 
2010-2015  
430 
 
The RRMUR relative variable has a significant negative coefficient at -0.52. This 
variable describes an elasticity of total amount of murabaha financing distributed 
by BPRS to changes on RRMUR relative. Generally speaking, the negative sign 
exhibits a contra-movement of RRMUR offered by BPRS and BUS-UUS which 
seems to illustrate that rate of returns on both banks always head for the opposite 
directions. However, that situation is unlikely to happen because BPRS often 
receive funding facility from BUS and UUS, thus, they need to set their murabaha 
rate of return higher than BUS and UUS in default. In normal situation, the 
RRMUR relative should have been positive since BPRS are compelled to maintain 
their own solvency. Nevertheless, the negative sign of RRMUR relative can be 
justified by the response of BUS and UUS on the fluctuation of RRMUR offered 
by BPRS. Being the market leader in the banking industry, BUS and UUS tend to 
be insensitive to changes on BPRS as their competitors. Despite the inabsolute 
value, the impact given by RRMUR of BPRS do not affect BUS and UUS in a way 
that make them reevaluate their rate of returns. 
 
The negative sign also shows that total amount of murabah financing distributed by 
BPRS goes down when RRMUR relative goes up. Since the RRMUR relative 
illustrates a comparison of RRMUR from BUS-UUS and BPRS, a high value of 
RRMUR relative represents an incompetitive market as a result of wide disparity 
between BPRS and BUS-UUS in determining rate of return. A high value of 
RRMUR relative also demonstrates a situation in which BUS and UUS are capable 
of managing the rate of return to be much lower than BPRS because rate of return 
offered by BPRS should always been higher.  Consequently, an increase in 
RRMUR relative motivates customers to switch to BUS and UUS and finally lower 
total amount of murabaha distributed by BPRS. 
 
Based on Table 2, the RRMUR of BPRS variable shows a significant negative 
coefficient at -1.65. When RRMUR offered by BPRS increases, customers switch 
from BPRS to BUS and UUS whose rate of return are lower, thus declining the 
amount of murabaha financing distributed by BPRS significantly. It is highly 
important to remember that in spite of the significant coefficient, a shift movement 
of customers from BPRS to BUS and UUS is only possible if BPRS, BUS, and 
UUS are located within the same area. 
 
The government has always encouraged BPRS to partake in developing suburbs. In 
remote areas where BUS and UUS are rarely found, customers have no choice but 
taking BPRS as the only option. When this situation occurs, BPRS have the 
advantage of RRMUR which eventually also increases the level of efficiency. 
However, the current policy issued by BI and OJK allows BPRS to open new 
branches in big cities. In this kind of situation, BPRS are imposed to a highly 
competitive market where they have to compete with larger banks like BUS and 
UUS. As a result, RRMUR offered by BPRS will be much lower, thus decreasing 
their level of efficiency. Furthermore, Muhari and Hosen (2015) find that BPRS 
that are located in the eastern region of Indonesia such as Papua and Maluku face 
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lower level of competition compared to those located in the western region i.e. 
Sumatera, Java, and Borneo due to more competitors.  
 
Among all independent variables in the model, the murabaha rate of return at 
BPRS exemplifies the highest contribution on total amount of murabaha financing. 
This can be seen from its high coefficient value at -1.65 and relatively low 
probability value at 0.03. Clearly, murabaha rate of return is a prerequisite for the 
increased of total amount of murabaha financing that BPRS might obtain. As a 
consequence, BPRS have to be very careful in conducting business activities which 
might lead to a fluctuation of RRMUR. 
 
In order to get a representative model, this study also includes control variables e.g. 
total offices of BPRS, consumer price index (CPI), and industrial production index 
(IPI). The positive and significant coefficient of total offices at 1.31 comes as no 
surprise. This coefficient has an implication that total amount of murabaha 
financing distributed by BPRS increases when BPRS expand their businesses by 
opening new branches or offices. Opening new branches lead to more third-party 
fund being absorbed from local customers. The total amount of third-party fund 
earned by BPRS are later distributed to several types of financing products, 
including murabaha. BPRS can create their own market without the existence of 
larger banks like BUS and UUS beforehand. These circumstances produce at least 
two conclusions. Firstly, BPRS are highly needed by the customers, particularly 
those who are residing in small towns or suburbs. Unfortunately, there is a 
mismatch between the needs of BPRS and the actual numbers of BPRS operating 
in areas that need them the most.  
 
For example, Papua has only one BPRS so far, namely BPRS Muamalat Yotefa in 
Jayapura (Condensed Financial Statement Sharia Banks 2016). This situation also 
occurs in many other provinces, mainly outside Java. Secondly, BPRS have a 
specific market segmentation namely micro, small, and medium entrepreneurs 
living in areas located far away from big cities.  
 
Between the two macro variables incorporated into the equation model CPI is 
found to be insignificant in affecting total amount of murabaha financing while IPI 
is proven to have a significant negative coefficient at -1.54. The result suggests that 
total amount of murabaha financing distributed by BPRS tend to decrease in a 
booming economy instead. The coefficient value of IPI is  almost  close  to  
RRMUR  of  BPRS,  making  it  as  the  second biggest contributor to the rise of 
murabaha financing distribution. 
 
4.2  The Influence of Market Concentration on Profitability 
 
This section of paper discusses about the influence of market concentration on 
profitability of BPRS by involving BUS and UUS. Table 3 demonstrates 
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descriptive statistics of the variables while Table 4 shows the results of regression 
analysis. 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics of The Influence of Market Concentration on 
Profitability Model 
 TR BBH BTK BKAP EQ FINC NPF 
Mean 307726 186171. 4644 12091 679060 342174 261871. 
Med. 282992 135937 3972 11344 650989 340473 230466 
Max. 782054 796943 12905 32427 105417 543363 590903 
Min. 29789 12991.0 382 1064 405870 158657 116745 
Std. Dev 190827 167405 3149.28 7697.82 196789 117907 117871 
Skewn. 0.55 1.82 0.72 0.70 0.31 0.06 0.71 
Kurt. 2.54 6.29 2.74 3.07 1.78 1.61 2.50 
Number 
of 
observatio
n 
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Table 4 shows that concentration ratio of the four largest banks has an insignificant 
coefficient value at -0.50 and p-value at 0.11 in affecting ROE.5 This insignificant 
influence seems to reject the traditional hypothesis of structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) which asserts a collusion or any other forms of non-competitive 
behavior among several largest banks in offering lower deposit rates and higher 
loan rates to the customers.6 This result is in contrast to the negative significant 
influence of concentration ratio on ROA with coefficient value at -0.17 and p-value 
at 0.00. Nevertheless, Fahmi (2012) has proven that one significant influence 
between concentration ratio to profitability is merely enough to confirm a collusion 
among the largest banks. Market share variable is needed to confirm the theory.7 
Even though the four largest BUS are dominating the market, those BUS do not 
utilize their powers to gain supernormal profits which can be disadvantageous to 
the customers and BPRS as their competitors. Instead, the four largest BUS 
become more competitive and more efficient in order to achieve higher profits. A 
rejection of SCP theory have also been found in numerous studies, both 
conventional banks as well as Islamic banks (Smirlock, 1985; Sarita et al., 2012; 
Fahmi, 2012; Yudaruddin, 2014; Barua et al., 2016).  
                                                          
5Since the previous result proves that BPRS, BUS, and UUS are operating within the same 
market, concentration ratio (CR) variable is taken from the four largest banks amongst 
those three types of banks which all of them happen to be BUS. 
6In addition to concentration rate (CR), market share (MS) can be used as an independent 
variable to support the efficiency hypothesis in banking industry yet this paper elimnates it 
due to time-series characteristics of the data being run. Thus, future studies are highly 
encouraged to use panel data in order to incorporate MS into the estimation model. 
7It is unlikely for this study to include MS variable due to the time-series data being used.  
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Table 4. Regression Result of the Influence of Market Structure on Profitability 
Model (Y = ROA and ROE) 
Y ROE ROA 
X Coeff t-statistic P-Value Coeff t-statistic P-Value 
Constants 2.01 2.43* 0.02* 0.47 6.08* 0.00* 
Concentration Ratio -0.50 -1.61 0.11 -0.17 -5.66* 0.00* 
Total Asset -2.04 -3.86* 0.00* -0.08 -1.62 0.11 
Third-Party Fund 1.97 4.06* 0.00* 0.03 0.69 0.49 
Operating Expense Ratio -0.47 -3.18* 0.00* -0.01 -0.77 0.44 
Capital Adequacy Ratio -0.87 -3.28* 0.00* 0.01 0.42 0.67 
R-squared 0.76* 0.71* 
F-test 0.00* 0.00* 
Note: *5% level of significance. 
 
 There has been no specific system or mechanism designed by BI or FSA to ensure 
that collusive behavior stays away from banking institution in Indonesia, including 
Islamic banks. It remains unclear whether Islamic banks are avoiding collusive 
practices due to their Islamic values and principles or the nature of competitive 
market. The latter argument have been put forward by previous researchers as 
“Constestable Market Theory”. In this concept, banks maintain their prices very 
competitive because there is always a threat from new entrants. In other words, the 
four largest BUS are still competing against other BUS units, UUS, and BPRS, 
despite their big market size. 
 
Figure 2. Division Territory of Financial Intermediary Institutions 
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Regardless of the insignificant influence of concentration ratio on profitability level 
of BPRS, the division territory among Islamic banks is still an important issue to 
discuss (Figure 2). Too many banks in some certain areas will create a less 
homogenous market, causing a lower efficiency level and higher financing risk at 
the same time due to high level of competition. Hence, BUS and UUS as the 
market leaders in the industry which stress on the quality of services, infrastructure, 
and technology are suggested to operate more in urban cities. Meanwhile, BPRS 
are expected to focus on subdivision areas where local approach is highly needed. 
In addition, BPRS are also encouraged to open new offices in the eastern region of 
Indonesia e.g.  Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Papua. The eastern region 
are still lacking of support from rural banks, thus opening up opportunities for 
BPRS to expand their market. As for smaller areas like subdistricts, saving and 
loan of cooperatives  are highly advised to take over. Such a situation where an 
integrated banking regulation to all types of banks is implemented to benefit the 
entire part of Islamic banking industry, including BPRS.  
 
In relation to ROE, total asset has shown a significant negative coefficient at -2.04 
and p-value at 0.00. This means that ROE will decrease by 0.24 when total amount 
of asset increases by 1%. Meanwhile, total asset has an insignificant negative 
coefficient at -0.08 and p-value at 0.11 when it comes to ROA. Despite the 
disagreement on significant level, both models support a negative influence 
between total assets to profits of BPRS. This whole situation can be explained 
because BPRS are less capable of managing their non-financing asset. BPRS have 
always been focusing on financing distribution, explaining their high financing to 
deposit ratio (FDR). In October 2016, BPRS had an FDR at 117.86% (FSA 2016).  
 
This percentage shows that not only that BPRS use their total amount of third-party 
fund to financing customers, but also their own capitals and loans from BUS and 
UUS. When BPRS are experiencing a surge of total amount of asset, they face 
difficulties in distributing it directly to loan customers and other financial 
instruments which also creates a time gap. Hence, a rise of total amount of asset at 
BPRS will cause a decrease of profitability level instead. To overcome this issue, 
BPRS should learn how to distribute their asset to other profitable financial 
instruments. Building new offices and providing local-based service can also be an 
option, since they will lead to a higher profitability for BPRS in long term. 
 
Third-party fund variable has a significant positive coefficient value at 1.97 and p-
value at 0.00 in affecting ROE. This means that ROE will increase by 0.197 units 
when total amount of third-party fund increases by 1%. Similar to ROE, third-party 
fund also influences ROA positively at 0.03, yet with an insignificant influence. 
Thus, it is believed that third-fund party generally influences profits level of BPRS 
positively. As it has been explained previously, an increase of third-party fund 
always leads to rise of financing distribution. This situation occurs because BPRS 
have a tendency to distribute all of their total amount of third-party fund to 
financing customers, causing a very high financing to deposit ratio (FDR). The 
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process finally cause an increasing profitability level of BPRS. Among all 
independent variables, total amount of third-party fund and total asset have the 
highest coefficients value which means that BPRS should pay attention to changes 
on these two variables in order to increase their level of profitability in the future.  
 
Operating expense ratio (OER) variable has a significant negative coefficient at -
0.47 in influencing ROE. This coefficient indicates that profitability will decrease 
by 0.47 units when OER increases by one unit. On the other hand, OER appears to 
have an insignificant influence on ROA at -0.01. In spite of the distinction in 
significant level, both results move toward a conclusion that a high level of 
expense will result in lower profit level. 
 
Indonesian banking industry, both conventional banks and Islamic banks, tends to 
have low level of efficiency. This can be seen by OER of 87.35% at BPRS in 
October 2016 (FSA 2016). This low efficiency level of BPRS indicates a bad 
management of financing which will eventually cause a lower profitability level.  
 
The negative influence between OER on ROE and ROA proves an efficiency 
hypothesis for BPRS. Thus, an increasing of profitability level is not merely caused 
by market structure, but by efficiency level of the banks as well. Fahmi (2012) 
found similar result for BUS and UUS, while Yudaruddin (2014) supports this 
result by analyzing Indonesian banking industry in aggregate. If this result is linked 
to Muhari and Hosen (2015), it can be envisaged that BPRS in western region of 
Indonesia are estimated to have a lower level of profitability due to a relatively 
lower level of efficiency. On the contrary, BPRS in the eastern region enjoy a 
higher profitability since their efficiency level is relatively higher than the western 
region.  
 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) variable has a significant negative coefficient of -
0.87 in affecting ROE. This means that ROE will decrease by 0.87 unit when CAR 
increases by one unit. This result can be explained by characteristics of BPRS in 
distributing their financing. Due to a high level of FDR, BPRS are required to 
increase their CAR target. In order to meet the new target of CAR, BPRS must 
borrow fresh loan from BUS or UUS which is quite expensive. This circumstance 
will eventually cause a lower profitability level at some points. However, CAR 
demonstrates a positive influence on ROA with an insignificant coefficient at 0.01. 
Since the former model (ROE) implies a higher significant level instead of the 
latter model (ROA), a negative relationship between CAR and profit level is taken 
as a stronger conclusion. 
 
In summary, the regression coefficients of most independent variables in the ROA 
model are not found to be significant as in the ROE model. Hence, we accept ROE 
as a more efficient measure of profitability in analyzing the structure-conduct-
performance of BPRS in Indonesia. 
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4.3 The Influence of Market Concentration on Financing Risk 
 
This section illustrates how market concentration rate of the four largest BUS 
affects non-performing ratio of BPRS. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of each 
variable, both dependent variable as well as independent variables, while Table 6 
describes the results of regression analysis. 
 
According to Table 5, the result of this study supports competition-fragility theory  
in BPRS industry which is shown by a significant negative influence of 
concentration ratio of the four largest BUS on NPF of BPRS at -0.27. As indicated 
by Figure 1, there is an inversed movement between CR4 and NPF where an 
increase of concentration rate by one unit will decrease NPF by 0.12 unit. A highly 
concentration rate indicates a low degree of competition among business units 
because the largest few of business entities tend to dominate the market. Since 
concentration rate is proven to influence NPF, a decreasing level of competition is 
most likely enhance financing risk faced by BPRS. This situation has occurred to 
BPRS for the past five years where the NPF rate gradually increases (Financial 
Authority Service 2016). Thus, regulators should be careful in formulating policies  
that could affect Islamic banking industry to be more concentrated. The main 
reason is because this study proves that a more competitive and concentrated 
market increase might harm BPRS in terms of financing risk. 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of The Influence of Market Concentration on 
Financing Risk Model 
 NPF FDR ROA CAR 
RRMUR
BUSUUS 
CR4 CPI 
Mean 0.07 1.28 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.63 127.38 
Median 0.07 1.28 0.03 0.24 0.15 0.60 126.93 
Maximum 0.10 1.40 0.04 0.30 0.73 0.71 146.84 
Minimum 0.06 1.19 0.02 0.22 0.12 0.58 110.99 
Std. Dev 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.05 10.28 
Skewness 1.06 0.28 0.73 0.85 7.38 0.60 0.13 
Kurtosis 3.75 2.39 3.26 2.93 56.36 1.63 2.17 
Number of 
observatio
n 
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Table 6. Regression Result of the Influence of Market Concentration on 
Financing Risk Model 
Key Variable Coefficients t-statistic P-Value 
Constant 0.34 0.00* 0.00* 
Concentration Ratio -0.27 -6.39* 0.00* 
Return rate of murabaha – BUS and UUS -0.01 -0.64 0.52 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.10 1.76 0.08 
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Financing to Deposit Ratio 0.07 4.14* 0.00* 
Return on Asset -0.45 -1.86 0.07 
Consumer Price Index -0.04 1.76* 0.00* 
R-squared 0.72 
F-test 0.00 
Note: *5% level of significance.   
 
Concentration rate for the largest Islamic banks has decreased from May 2011 at 
68.26% to May 2015 at 59.51% (FSA 2016). Despite the declining pattern, this 
movement needs to be analyzed carefully because recent studies surprisingly found 
a non-linear relationship between concentration rate and financing risk of banks by 
using General Method of Moments-estimator (Heimdal and Solberg 2015; 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010). 
 
However, the main limitation of this paper compared to others is OLS as the 
method used, thus, it will be mostly unlikely to confirm the existence of non-linear 
relationship in the equation model unless panel data are being applied. FDR has a 
significant positive coefficient at 0.07 with p-value at 0.00. The coefficient shows 
that an increase of FDR by one unit will lead to an increase of NPF by 0.07 unit. 
The argument behind the rise of financing risk while the amount of financing being 
distributed increases is a poor financing management system at BPRS. However, 
the primary contributor to this positive correlation between FDR and NPF is 
mainly because customers often consider BPRS as a second layer industry. In fact, 
customers generally prefer bigger banks with more sophisticated technology and 
facility (BUS and UUS) to smaller banks (BPRS). 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Concentration Ratio and Non-Performing Ratio of BPRS 
(In Percentage) 
 
Source: Sharia Banking Statistic May 2016. 
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Despite the high demand of financing from customers, BUS and UUS still process 
every application that comes in. This situation will result in many rejected 
customers with bad business prospects. Those unqualified customers will switch to 
smaller banks like BPRS. Meanwhile, BPRS provide an easier access for customers 
to apply for financing product compared to BUS and UUS in order to survive in the 
market. As a result, an adverse selection problem will eventually arise because 
many customers are willing to take high risk in terms of higher rate of return. In 
reality, BPRS always offer a higher rate of return for financing products compared 
to BUS and UUS. Customers realize that they cannot afford to pay the rate of 
return yet they still take the risk which causes a higher NPF rate in return. 
 
This equation model also includes macro variable, namely costumer price index 
(CPI). CPI as a proxy of inflation has a significant negative coefficient at -0.04 
with p-value at 0.00. This means that NPF will decrease by 0.04 unit when CPI 
increases by one unit. The negative relationship is caused by a contrast-movement 
between inflation and sharia financing instruments such as sharia bank Indonesia 
certificates (SBI) and certificate of wadiah bank Indonesia (SWBI).8 While the 
prices are rising, the rate of return from SBI and SWBI will be decreasing. In 
response to this, BPRS later are encouraged to lower their financing return of rate 
or margin. This process will eventually increase customers’ productivity due to a 
more affordable financing product. Purchasing power of people will also increase 
as final customers in  their installment payment smoothly. At the end of the 
process, NPF is becoming even lower than before. Poetry and Sanrego (2011) also 
found similar result. Meanwhile among all of the independent variables, return rate 
of murabaha at BUS and UUS, capital adequacy ratio, and return on asset are found 
to be insignificant in influencing the financing risk faced by BPRS.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The result of the first model shows that BPRS, BUS, and UUS have been proven to 
operate within the same murabaha market. Furthermore, the second model 
successfully explained the influence of market concentration to profits generated 
by BPRS while the last model reveals how the market concentration affects 
financing risk faced by BPRS. According to all of the models, the purpose of this 
study which is to analyze the influence of market structure on performance of 
BPRS has been answered as follows: 
1. Total amount of murabaha financing distributed by BPRS is influenced 
significantly by rate of return murabaha offered by BUS and UUS, rate of 
return murabaha offered by BPRS, rate of return relative, total offices, and 
industrial production index. Consumer price index is the only independent 
variable which has no significant influence on total amount of murabaha 
                                                          
8Poetry, Zakiyah Dwi ,dan Yulizar D Sanrego. 2011. “Pengaruh Variabel Makro dan 
Mikro terhadap NPL Perbankan Konvensional dan NPF Perbankan Syariah.” Tazkia 
Islamic Finance and Business Review 6 (2): 94. 
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financing. In conclusion, BPRS, BUS, and UUS are operating and 
competing in the same market. 
2. Model two proves that ROE is a better measurement of profitability for 
BPRS compared to ROA due to the number of significant independent 
variables e.g. total asset, third-party fund, operating expense ratio, and 
capital adequacy ratio.   
3. ROA leads to the same conclusion that an efficiency hypothesis applies in 
the Islamic banking environment of Indonesia.  
4. Model three reveals a significant influence between non-performing 
financing of BPRS as dependent variable and several independent variables 
which consist of concentration ratio financing to deposit ratio, and 
consumer price index. In summary, the model suggests a competition-
fragility is the best theory to describe how the market concentration 
influences financing risk faced by BPRS.  
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